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AN ALTOGETHER NEW PRINCE FIVE CENTURIES ON: 
BRINGING MACHIAVELLI TO BEAR ON OUR PRESENT
Our situation demands a new encounter with the thought of Machiavelli, and this confrontation involves a simultaneous engage-ment with Machiavelli’s thought and our time. However, contrary 
to prevalent approaches, it is neither a merely textual or scholastic exegesis 
nor a ‘return’ to Machiavelli, but an attempt to put Machiavelli’s thought to 
work in our time, so as to try to take the measure of our situation and envis-
age possible effective interventions in it. Both aspects or, as we could say, 
‘diagnoses’, depend on a prior operation which consists in placing Machia-
velli in its proper site: in the battlefront, confronting the grave problems we 
face. But this has direct consequences for us; it interpellates our own posi-
tioning and therefore questions the extent to which we desire to transform 
our situation or are attached to it.
In accordance with this approach, this essay will unfold in three parts. Firstly, 
I attempt to further clarify the Machiavellian site and to question from there 
intellectual and scholarly positions as they are usually understood and 
exercised. Secondly, I focus on the ways by which capitalism has brought 
about an altogether new temporality able to continuously renew itself 
through ever more frequent shocks and tremors which produce the kind 
of de-subjectivated human matter it needs. Finally. I address the conditions 
for the emergence of new fi gures of the people which may open the way 
to political subjectivation and thus bring about a new prince or collective 
subject commensurate with the new temporality. But before this, some 
preliminary remarks by way of introduction seem necessary.
One may feel that neither is Machiavelli’s battlefront ours nor are our 
problems his problems. But those would be deceptive feelings. Indeed since 
nobody can deliberately wish to lead a vivere servo (a servile way of life), 
the conclusion to be drawn is that Machiavelli’s battlefront may well be 
everyone’s own, unless one has resigned oneself to accept that we already 
lead a vivere libero (a free way of life) or that, anyway, there is no alternative. 
With regard to the problems we face, it is true, as I want to show in this 
paper, that our situation has to be qualifi ed as ‘altogether new’. Our current 
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predicament is essentially defi ned by the seemingly inescapable, world-wide 
and all-encompassing subjection of ‘human matter’, which is desiring matter, 
to the automatisms of the capitalist machinery. The problem is thus not only 
one of depersonalisation of political and social life; the gravest problem 
is that, in an apparently complete twist of Machiavelli, what is regularly 
renewed today is corruption—‘corruption’, to be read not as bribery and 
similar things which are only the effects of corruption, but Machiavellianly, 
as political unfi tness—so that this unfi tness for a truly political or free way of 
life has become mechanically self-reproduced and thus endemic. 
In this situation one may wonder about the status of what must be called 
Machiavelli’s principle of conservation of virtù, a political variant of the fi rst 
principle of thermodynamics formulated for the fi rst time by Machiavelli. 
This should not be too much of a surprise if one takes into account the 
philosophical background of Machiavelli’s thought, that is, Epicurean 
philosophy with Democritean atomic physics at its core. The principle 
concerns a very subtle variety of energy which is energy political and whose 
name is virtù—a term to be read and understood not as moral virtue (‘virtute’ 
in Machiavelli’s language) but in the comprehensive Machiavellian sense 
of virtue and “free from moraline (moralinfreie)”, to put it in Nietzsche’s 
apposite expression (The Antichrist 2).
“ I judge the world—thus Machiavelli formulates the principle—
always to have been in the same mode and there to have been 
as much good as bad in it. But the bad and the good vary from 
province to province ... though the world remained the same ... 
[and when virtù has not been] kept together, it is seen nonetheless 
to be scattered in many nations” (Discourses II Preface.2).1
Many may be tempted to take the view that, with the capitalist machinery 
holding tight the whole world and practically all realms of life, the world is 
rapidly losing virtù and Machiavelli’s principle is rendered null and ineffectual. 
Yet, a different interpretation is not only possible, but necessary—one more 
consistent with Machiavelli’s thought. I therefore assume that the effect of 
capitalism is not to diminish virtù in the world, that not even capitalism has, 
so far, been able to do that, but to make it even more scattered and dispersed, 
and thereby weaker so that the veritable diffi culty today lies in bringing it 
or enough of it together. That this is possible is shown by a most remarkable 
implication of Machiavelli’s principle, namely, that all peoples in the world 
1 I use Discourses, Prince, Histories and similar titles to refer to Machiavelli’s works; see bibliography. 
As customary, I quote by book (Roman numerals), chapter and eventually paragraph.
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are capable of virtù. This implication can be immanently drawn from the 
conservation principle when the latter is placed in its context, that is, within 
Machiavelli’s (Epicurean or Lucretian) materialist philosophy of chance. But 
proof of it at the historical level is not lacking, and Machiavelli takes care to 
provide a good list which includes not only the Romans, but the Assyrians, 
the Persians, the Franks, the Turks, the Germans and the “Saracen sect” (Ibid.), 
that is, the Muslim peoples. This shows that Machiavelli’s principle is fully 
modern and very adequate to our situation. Just as the Cartesian cogito but 
at the level of politics, it is the modernity that declares that, in what matters 
most, the truly important question is not, as the last decades have preached, 
about difference, but about sameness. Indeed, can we think of a more apt 
variant of the (Badiouian) egalitarian prescription, to which it seems to add 
an unexpected but perhaps productive twist, than the idea that all peoples in 
the world are capable of virtù?
This means that the bases for pursuing the struggle for a free way of life 
are there; however, they are so scattered that one can hardly see anything 
resembling a proper battlefront today. In this situation, placing Machiavelli 
in the battlefront can only mean to reopen his own battlefront in our 
present and to declare today’s lines and positions fl imsy and in need of 
re-drafting at all levels. This article is meant as an initial step toward this task, 
which essentially consists in examining the conditions for such reopening 
by means of a Machiavellian diagnosis of our times and an analysis of the 
extent to which the existing human matter is made politically inept or “lives 
politically (viv[e] politicamente)” (Discourses III 8.1).
Using Machiavelli’s language and concepts seems adequate in an article on 
Machiavelli, but it is necessary in dealing with our situation. This is due to the 
corruption of language, to the fact that many of the most important terms we 
use and see used as a matter of course, and through which we think or believe we 
think—i.e. primarily those which, as we shall see in this article, carry and impose 
the liberal ideas and politics—have become totally unfi t to describe how things 
are and, as importantly, how we wish them to be. For language is both the fi rst 
casualty and a chief instrument of corruption, so that it immediately corrupts 
the main political faculty, that is, political judgement (or practical wisdom, 
phronesis), and the main political bond, that is, friendship or comradeship. As 
it is argued in what is perhaps the most famous speech in Florentine Histories: 
“fi rst, there is neither union nor friendship among the citizens, except among 
those who have knowingly committed some wickedness...” (III 5). This means 
that instead of companionship, fellowship, comradeship or friendship, what 
we have is relations between ‘accomplices’, also known as partners.
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But Machiavelli’s language only dispenses its full meaning as part of his 
style and tempo—that “boisterous allegrissimo”, as Nietzsche praised it in 
Beyond Good and Evil, in which he “presented the most serious matters” 
(aphorism 28). For Machiavelli’s style, that joyfulness so dear to Nietzsche 
and in no way out of tune with his gaya scienza, is not a simple external 
form which, like a cloak, can be put on and thrown off at any time, but 
is fully consistent with Machiavelli’s stance and his view of knowledge as 
requiring both seriousness and cheerfulness, gravity and lightness. This is 
well known and has been highlighted in Machiavelli scholarship; however, 
these oppositions are defi cient and far from fully grasping the attitudes and 
the dialectics involved, since cheerfulness, irony, comedy and distance are 
themselves taken most seriously, while seriousness itself is playfully exercised. 
This is because playful detachment, irony and the like are not a mere self-
referential game, closed upon one’s own self, but an open attitude towards 
the world which transgresses social conventions and taboos, and sheds light 
on things and aspects of things that would otherwise remain undisclosed. 
Doing that, combining gravity and lightness so that they appear “joined 
in an almost impossible conjunction” (Histories VIII 36) in a single person, 
“seems praiseworthy to me”—Machiavelli tells his friend Vettori in a famous 
letter—“because we imitate nature, which is varied [che è varia]” (Letters, 31 
January 1515). Machiavelli’s style and tempo are thus the style and tempo of 
a stance and a praxis, from which they are inseparable—an audacious stance 
and an intrepid praxis which, as Nietzsche argued, “risk[ed] long, diffi cult, 
hard, dangerous thoughts and the tempo of the gallop and the very best, 
most capricious humour” (Ibid.). If Machiavelli’s style is inimitable—the 
closest to it today is probably Slavoj Žižek’s, although Žižek is a Hegelian, 
with all the advantages, perhaps philosophical, and disadvantages, probably 
political, that this may have—then let us at least not lose his joyful ‘matter-
of-factness’ approach, so suitable for thought and action.
1.  THE MACHIAVELLIAN SITE AND THE COURT HUMANISTS OF HIS 
AND OUR TIMES
The approach taken in this article is intended to be consistent with both 
Machiavelli’s own approach, that dialectic between theory and practice 
which goes under the name of “effectual truth (verità effettuale)” (Prince 15), 
and the effectual truth of our situation. Both determine the battlefront as 
the only site appropriate to our situation and faithful to the militant stance 
of a man who, “driven (spinto) by that natural desire that has always been 
in me to work (operare), without any fear (sanza alcuno respetto), for those 
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things I believe will bring common benefi t to everyone”, did not hesitate to 
take a path “no less dangerous ... than to seek unknown waters and lands” as 
is striving after a new politics or, in his own words, “new modes and orders” 
(Discourses I Preface). This is a most bold step; by taking it Machiavelli parts 
company with Lucretian philosophy, and not only with this philosophy. So 
no ‘Epicurean gardens’, which in a world like the one depicted by Epicurus 
and Lucretius can only be delusory, but politics.
This has immediate implication for us, for our positioning. Machiavelli’s 
ironical posing as a supplicant before an actual prince in the dedicatory letter 
of The Prince defi es us to think through our own position. For we need not 
be the kind of captain Machiavelli refers to—“That a captain ought to be a 
knower of sites”, thus he entitles a chapter of the Discourses (III 39), where 
captain stands for a major fi gure of the subject and sites are either battle sites 
or related to the struggle—in order to know and recognise the truth of one’s 
position, which is the fi rst truth without which there can be no other truth. 
I therefore assume that we are in the trenches and that we cannot pretend 
to simply observe and analyse the war from afar, unsullied by the struggle—
except, let us be clear, as part, and undoubtedly a fundamental part, of the 
combat operations. Consistent with his own position, Machiavelli himself 
challenges us, most visibly in the dedications of his two major works, to 
pursue his (in)famous path. Nobody has been closer to understanding 
the Machiavellian site than L. Althusser when, on Gramsci’s trail and 
after Lefort’s great work (1986), he argues that Machiavelli “hails us [nous 
interpelle] from a place that he summons us to occupy as potential ‘subjects’ 
(agents) of a potential political practice” (1995: 79; 1999: 32)—only we need 
no longer inverted commas to refer to the notion of subject, nor do we want 
to suggest that the subject could be a mere ‘agent’. Indeed we consider it as 
a major category of politics, one that today—that is, in case someone thinks 
that Machiavelli did not claim this rare fi gure of excess—has been fully 
reconstructed at the core of a philosophy, nothing less than Alain Badiou’s, 
Althusser’s disciple. Nobody has better analysed Machiavelli’s ‘theoretical 
dispositive’, its quality of having been thought through ‘in the conjuncture’ 
and the political practice derived from this, than Althusser. 
And yet we have to distance ourselves from Althusser when he practically 
reduces Machiavelli’s revolutionary project, although not its revolutionary 
consequences, to the problem of Italian unifi cation. Althusser is right 
in highlighting the question of the conjuncture as absolutely central to 
Machiavelli’s thought; he was the fi rst to undertake a most thorough 
analysis fully consequent with this idea. In doing this he pointed out the 
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right direction to us. However, it is not diffi cult to show that Machiavelli’s 
conjuncture is much wider than the conjunctural problem posed by Italian 
unifi cation, just as today’s conjuncture is much wider than the problem 
posed by European unifi cation. I likewise claim that what Althusser calls the 
‘dual point of view’ is not “irreducible” (1995: 72; 1999: 26), but subjected 
to a higher point of view, that of the subject, and that it is only within the 
latter, which can be reduced neither to that of ‘the founder’ (this is elitism, 
and the Straussians are obviously its keenest practitioners) nor to that of the 
people or the multitude (this is what we should probably call democratism, 
and its keenest practitioners are to be found in the left), that the dual point 
of view is effectual. 
Machiavelli’s project is of a much wider scope and longer range than the 
problem of Italian unifi cation; the struggle that he initiated could not end 
with Italian unifi cation or with any other kind of fi nal resolution—just as 
Marx’s project cannot and could not, contrary to utopian expectations, 
have an end. It is in accordance with this eminently endless character of the 
struggle that Machiavelli theorised a praxis and its transmission—a praxis 
whose continuous character must be strongly emphasised, as it involves 
both the everyday and the extraordinary. Machiavelli’s intervention exceeds 
therefore the historically specifi c conjuncture and becomes an intervention 
in the human predicament. He thus undertook very careful preparations for 
the transmission of his thought, particularly to the youth, whom he treated 
as his privileged addresses in what concerns the extraordinary on account of 
the fact that the young’s impetuousness allows them to entertain a privileged 
relation with chance and thus with fortuna, which for this very reason “is 
a friend of the young, because they are less cautious, more ferocious, and 
command her with more audacity” (Prince 25). This is also the reason why 
he dedicated his Discourses on Livy to his young friends, whom he called 
“princes”, a polysemic word in Machiavelli and the name of the subject par 
excellence which here means “not those who are princes but those who for 
their infi nite good parts deserve to be”. But Machiavelli addresses himself 
to all, or rather, to anyone; anyone, in the fi gure of the singular universal, is 
encouraged to follow his militant path: 
“ For it is the duty of a good man (è offi zio di uomo buono)—he 
says—to teach others the good that you could not put into effect 
(operare) because of the malignity of the times and of fortune, so 
that when many are capable of it, someone of them more loved 
by heaven may be able to put it into effect (operarlo)” (Discourses 
II Preface 3).
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What is the Machiavellian path, then, that (in)famous “path as yet untrodden 
by anyone (una via, ... ancora de alcuno trita)” which Machiavelli claimed 
he “without any fear”, “decided to take”? (Discourses I Preface). There may be 
and there have been many disputes about the precise nature of that path, but 
what cannot be disputed is, fi rst of all, that in pursuing such path Machiavelli 
began an altogether new war: a new war in a new territory against a new 
enemy which required a new battlefront. Secondly, that Machiavelli declared, 
opened and defi ned that battlefront. And thirdly, the historical reality of 
such battlefront, which has never ceased to split and allocate adversaries and 
contenders along its demarcating lines, and its enduring existence up to the 
present. However, today perhaps more than ever this battlefront has to be 
reopened, all too often populated as it is by scholars bent on blurring the 
battle lines. We are not concerned here with the Straussian scholarship on 
Machiavelli, since their camp is crystal-clear: they have some trouble with the 
position of the people as a peculiar kind of political subject in Machiavelli, 
but even more with Machiavelli’s unveiling of the aristocratic prejudice, or 
‘premise’, as mere oligarchic ideology, so that, consistent with their nostalgic 
elitism, they believe they resolve this tension by considering Machiavelli’s 
view as “extremely populist” (Strauss 1958: 131).2
Who are then the scholars bent on blurring the battle lines? They are today’s 
court humanists, not fundamentally different from the court humanist of 
Machiavelli’s time. They are to be found among the many varieties of civic 
republicanism, among the growing number of those who spot ever more 
‘Machiavellian moments’—even in French thought, if we are to believe 
Miguel Abensour (2011), has one of such moments taken place, or is taking 
place, curiously enough without Althusser—and a whole array of other 
interpretations, including neo-Foucauldian ones. But they are not confi ned 
to Machiavelli scholarship, and here one should mention the theoreticians 
of the ‘return of the political’. Today’s court humanists are therefore those, 
particularly on the Left, whose critical stance is suspiciously infl uenced by 
the reassuring feeling of being after all fully at home in the system, so that 
they tend to present a domesticated fi gure of Machiavelli which excludes 
some of the most decisive aspects of his thought which do not fi t their stance 
of adaptation. It seems thus timely to recall that Machiavelli took the court 
humanists of his own time to task, even if he had to in part use their own 
language so as to entice his mainly humanist readership and lead them to his 
own non humanist, not to say anti-humanist, perspective. 
2 For a pointed analysis of some of the main modern vindications of Machiavelli, see Balakrishnan 
(2005).
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For Machiavelli’s ‘untrodden path’ was not only opened against (classical or 
idealist) political philosophy, or what was taken to be such, that is, in essence 
a refl ection on politics allegedly pursued from a philosophical stance of 
‘neutrality’ towards ‘the political’ which immunises against actual politics.3 
Nor was it against religion alone, despite the boldness of Machiavelli’s 
attack and the consequential nature of his break with Christianity both as 
religion and ‘sect’ (meaning the organised clergy), or only against religious 
fundamentalism (as incarnated, for instance, by Savonarola, the ‘unarmed 
prophet’ who was a keen preacher of book burning and ended up fuelling a 
bonfi re in Piazza della Signoria). Such new path was also and in a fundamental 
way opened against the civic humanists’ republican discourse and the stance 
of adaptation to the powers that be on which it was based. 
The signifi cance of this critique cannot possibly be overemphasised—it was 
fundamental in Machiavelli’s times and it is equally so today. This has to do 
with the fact that the civic humanists enjoyed a good reputation, as they 
spoke as passionate advocates of the new times against the medieval ones 
and thus of the active life against the contemplative one, of worldly liberty 
against otherworldly salvation and of the civic participation of citizens in 
their own self-government—roughly the same republican discursive tenets 
one fi nds today, including in the form of a supposedly ‘return of the political’ 
proclaimed precisely when actual politics was becoming more and more 
reactionary. With such discourse the civic humanists undoubtedly fl attered 
their times and pleased the oligarchy. As far as the reality of actual politics 
is concerned, as seen, for example, through the minutes of the councils 
(consulte or pratiche) to which infl uential Florentines were summoned by the 
gonfalonier Soderini, F. Gilbert (1984) has shown that in reality the humanists’ 
discourse shared the same basic principles and concerns as the other two 
discourses or currents of opinion present in the councils, namely: what may 
be called the realists, repeatedly exposed by Machiavelli as “the wise men of 
our times”, who incessantly preached “to enjoy the benefi t of time” (Prince 
3) and remind us of the ‘wise Marxist’ of yore preaching that ‘history is in 
our side’; and the Christians, mainly Savonarola’s followers (dubbed piagnoni, 
weepers or snivelers, by Machiavelli). It is very conservative principles and 
concerns which, in different variants, can be found in most periods; they 
centre around concord among citizens (hence the perils of confl ict; in this all 
discourses seem to be Habermasians avant la lettre, bent on de-antagonising), 
the inherent goodness of supposedly original institutions (hence the perils of 
3 See Badiou (1998) for a critique of the thinking of politics known as political philosophy.
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change), the virtue of the happy middle and of temporising—all denounced 
by Machiavelli as delusions serving to support the oligarchic powers and 
misconceptions having a devastating effect on the youth, many of whom 
were thereby intellectually misled and politically disabled. 
It is all too evident that essentially the same stance and to all practical effects 
equivalent principles and concerns are upheld by the humanists’ epigones 
of our time, who also indulge in the pleasant republican topics of active 
citizenship and political participation. Underpinning their stance as critical 
but integrated voices within the system there is an almost compulsive 
attachment to the status quo and a vigilant fear of losing their position in 
it. Theirs is exactly the position which blurs the battle lines and hampers 
the split into two of politics, thereby providing a decisive support for the 
system. Many will certainly claim that they practice just scholarship, that 
is, uninvolved or ‘neutral’; they do not seem concerned with the idea that 
perhaps any minimally consequent scholarly analysis of Machiavelli demands 
a more truthful position. Nor do they seem worried by the possibility that 
their scholarship may also serve to intellectually disorient and politically 
disqualify the young. 
Let us conclude this part by making a Weberian wager for a mutually enlivening 
distinction between scholarship and politics, which means holding onto the 
tensions between them and thus allowing to each their own autonomy and 
specifi c dignity. For the “effectual truth” is a check against delusions, not 
a device to stifl e thought and be stuck in what merely exists; nor can it be 
separated from “a strong ethical and political project” (del Lucchese 2010: 
16) whose emancipatory name for Machiavelli is a free way of life.
2.  CAPITALISM’S NEW TEMPORALITY: 
THE MECHANICAL RENEWAL OF CORRUPTION 
If we now consider our situation, our present predicament, as Machiavelli 
wanted, that is to say, by looking ‘il male in viso’ (evil in its face), and 
try to characterise what we see, then the following three-dimensional 
conceptualisation could do the initial job: a structuring activity defi ned by 
the automatisms of the capitalist machinery, the latter’s relentless labour on 
the human matter with which it feeds itself, and the ever more frequent 
radical disruption of everyday life through abrupt shakings and shocks 
which clear the ground for the ever-renewed expansion of capital circulation. 
This seemingly abstract and even totalising characterisation is after all 
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commensurate with the extremely abstract and (at the mechanical level, 
which is devoid of meaning) totalizing nature of capitalism. We can make 
it more concrete by referring to the fact that individuals, caught as they are 
in what Weber called “the mighty cosmos of the modern economic order” 
(Protestant Ethic, 1920: 203), certainly feel the power of that cosmos as an 
external, objective (‘cosmic’ or systemic) force. However, individuals are not 
simply caught in that cosmos, as if they were an external reality incorporated 
from the outside into it; for not only does this cosmos “determine with an 
irresistible constraining force” their lives, but, more signifi cantly, it “trains 
and forges” their beings (Ibid., 203 and 37). So individuals are not merely 
lured into consumption, for example, but shaped as consumers; indeed 
if need be—and this is a third level of, say, forging, which is often fi rst 
historically—they are violently compelled to become consumers. 
This violent imposition of a form is becoming more and more frequent; for a 
paradigmatic example think of students in England under the new university 
fees, forced into a regime of control and a coercive pedagogy—for compulsory 
debt-fi nancing is not a mere economic matter—which will ineluctably 
depoliticize and transform them into mere consumers. The case of the students 
is a good example of both capitalism’s “constant revolutionizing” of its own 
conditions and the extraordinary political violence (to be distinguished from 
the subsequent more strictly economic violence) which such revolutionizing 
requires. To Marx’s legendary description, done in an almost admiring tone 
of astonishment, of capitalism’s ‘deeds’, its “constant revolutionizing of 
production”, its “uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions” and its 
amazing dissolving power of bonds held to be solid or sacred, nothing can 
be added except the ever-higher pace of these processes. Indeed, whenever 
capitalism is the uncontested power in the world, it subjects it to an ever 
more devastating pace of shakings and shocks which affects so fully the 
everyday, supposedly normal, life that it is disruption itself what becomes 
normalised—herein lies the peculiar ontological status of capitalism today: 
it is a new temporality made up of disjointed moments whereby time is 
divested of practically any subjectivation proper, that is, of the dispositions 
oriented toward action and the patient dedication to an activity, to the 
construction of a praxis. Thus, with all the impulses to stretch out beyond 
the given curtailed, often by incorporation when they manage to emerge, all 
what is in principle allowed is sheer adaptation. Is this not the best indication 
of the stagnant, ossifi ed character—despite all the agitation—of our time?
The fi rst dimension in the three-fold characterisation we have just outlined 
is the more encompassing one; it consists in the deep and apparently 
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inescapable entrenchment of the automatisms of the self-propelling and 
ever-expanding circulation of capital. Once put in place, this machinery 
works mechanically, by itself, based on its own automatisms and thus in 
a totally depersonalised fashion. It was Weber who particularly emphasised 
this fundamental aspect of the capitalist machinery, the fact that the kind of 
relationship it creates “is the most impersonal relationship of practical life 
into which humans can enter with one another” (1978: 636). This is totally 
unheard-off and Machiavelli could not foresee it; and yet, Machiavelli’s view 
of politics and human life is, as I expect to show shortly, as suitable as ever 
to try and come to terms with it. Now this impersonal machinery is still 
a social machinery, indeed an economic-symbolic cosmos or matrix which 
needs human matter to function; so it takes human matter and shapes and 
moulds it in order to give it the forms, through a combination of violence 
and shaping of the affects, suitable to feed the automatisms. What moves it, 
what propels capital, is “one sole life impulse (einen einzigen Lebenstrieb)”, 
a “boundless blind drive (maßlos blinden Trieb)” which is an “immanent 
drive (immanente Trieb)” to ever renewed economic value in ever expanded 
forms (Capital I 10.1, 10.5 and 12). This is well known; what is less clear 
is the precise status of this drive and the way it inheres in human matter. 
According to Žižek, “drive inheres to capitalism at a more fundamental [than 
individual interpellation], systemic, level” (2006: 61); it is “the impersonal 
compulsion”, or, as he argues elsewhere, “the objectivized urge to compete 
and profi t, to keep the circulation of capital fl owing” (2009b: 453), which—
Žižek insists—is inscribed into the capitalist system itself. Yet it is only by 
inhering in human matter that the drive is a drive and is able to propel the 
system, and the manner wherein this happens remains unexplained. 
The fi rst thing to be said here, evident as it may seem, is that this is not a 
question of the “subjective appropriation (subjektive Aneignung)” of religious-
ethical maxims which underpinned the formation of the methodical life 
conduct so decisive in bringing about modern capitalism (Weber 1920: 161). 
Drive enters into action as a dominant force once the system is in place; but 
then the system can work by itself, “on a mechanical basis”, for “victorious 
capitalism needs its support”—the support of the initial subjectivation, that 
is, the ‘spirit’ of Protestant asceticism—“no longer” (Ibid., 204). Contrary 
to the initial subjectivation, that is—if we maintain Žižek’s fundamental 
elaboration of the distinction between desire and drive—to subjectivation 
in the mode of desire, which in a bitter battle against the traditional society 
“endeavoured to transform the world and be effective in it” (Ibid., 203), drive 
is entirely at the service of an already constituted system and its logic. 
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So, how does this inner compulsion with its quasi-objective character inhere 
in human matter, or how is the latter caught in it? The answer—we enter 
now into the second dimension of our initial characterisation—may well lie 
in the fact that, crucially, drive is directly linked to mere adaptation to the 
world and to specifi c desires contingent on such adaptation, including the 
desire to be and be seen as a ‘virtuoso’ of adaptation. Here Weber can also 
be of help, particularly through the idea of ‘Eingestelltheit’, a term which in 
Weber’s conceptualisation should be understood as an inner adjustment or 
attuning toward an existing system or organised practice which has become 
an almost unconscious set disposition and orientation.4 “The decisive impulse 
(Antrieb)—Weber argues—for all economic action under the conditions of 
a market economy is”, for the capitalist, alongside “one’s own capital-risk 
and profi t chances” (which is obviously in stark contrast with “the coercion 
[Zwang] exerted by the risk of complete deprivation” in the case of the 
workers, and which, as part of a rationally calculated operation, has nothing 
to do with the spirit of adventure), “an inner ‘professional’ adjustment 
(‘berufsmässige’ Eingestelltheit) towards rational acquisitive activity” (1976: 
60), that is, ultimately to the “self-moving substance” (Capital I 4), to the 
supposedly self-engendering circular movement of capital.
Now, to gauge the power of ‘Eingestelltheit’ in human action and conduct, 
and its signifi cance in Weber’s analysis, let us point out that this inner 
adjustment become set disposition is at the core not just of habit but, say, 
of habit gone mad, and, as such, tends to be experienced as binding and 
incorporated as expectation with regard to the conduct of others, to the point 
that it may become almost a de facto guarantee of enforcement (1976: 191-2). 
It is also a major foundation of, and an almost insurmountable obstacle to 
dispense with, the modern “bureaucratic apparatus of rule (bürokratischen 
Herrschaftsapparat)”, which obviously includes “public administration as 
well as private economic management”. The absolutely central historical 
signifi cance of such an apparatus, which has now evolved, as we shall see 
shortly, into a huge array of corporate managerial bureaucracies ruling almost 
unchallenged over practically all social realms and institutions, cannot possibly 
be overemphasised. But our point here is that it rests not only on “technical 
training and functional specialisation of work”, but on the bureaucrats’ and 
managers’ “inner adjustment (Eingestelltheit) to painstaking obedience” and 
to perform “single functions which are habitual and mastered in a virtuoso 
way” (Ibid., 570). The power of this “inner ‘disposition’ of the soul (innere 
4 See Economy and Society, ch. 2, section 14. The English translation (1978: 110) is very misleading.
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seelische ‘Eingestelltheit’) towards regularities” is such that Weber wonders 
about the possibility of novelty, including political ‘novelty’. For how “can 
any ‘novelties’ whatsoever emerge” when such disposition “hosts tangible 
‘inhibitions’ against novelties” (Ibid., 188)? What seems clear to Weber is 
that, in the political terrain, not revolt, let alone revolution, but restoration is 
what such disposition can foster and sustain, to the point that it is “through an 
appeal to this inner disposition (Eingestelltheit) to obedient compliance, bred 
in the offi cials and in the subjects alike” that “every reorganization of defeated 
or scattered army units, as well as every restoration of an administrative order 
destroyed by revolts, panics, or other catastrophes, is effected. If the appeal 
is successful it brings, as it were, the disturbed mechanism to ‘snap into gear’ 
again” (Ibid., 570, emphasis added).
In the case of the capitalist order or cosmos, the peculiarity of that inner 
disposition to adjust, according to Weber, is that it is performed 
“as) A ‘proof’ (‘Bewährung’) of one’s performance (Leistung) and B 
form of autonomous control over those human beings dependent 
on one’s own orders, as well as) C over the chances of an indefi nite 
number of people to access important cultural or life goods—in a 
word, power” (1976: 60).
What we have here is thus an almost pure instance of the subjectivity of 
power: in effect, true enjoyment of power seeks infi nitely more than just 
control and command over one’s fellows and their life chances (points and 
C above), it demands recognition as a deserved, and thus legitimate, power, 
ultimately based on who one is, on the greater excellence and worthiness 
of one’s own being—in the case of capitalism (point above), based on one’s 
superior performance, so on the amount of profi t and on this alone, which 
is the ‘proof’ of one’s superior qualities and hence of one’s own superiority. 
We are thus in the terrain of desire, which seems to reinforce and even 
underpin that of drive. As a direct manifestation of drive, Eingestelltheit has to 
be radically distinguished from the subjectivation attached to a very different 
inner disposition which Weber called ‘Gesinnung’, often translated as inner 
conviction and, problematically, as conviction simply. “Eingestelltheit and 
Gesinnung both set the individual inwardly to certain orientations and 
behaviours” (Darmon 2011: 207), but here their similarity ends. Thus while 
Gesinnung is a quest to go beyond the given which involves the development 
of a conduct of life or a praxis (Gesinnung—says Hegel in Phenomenology—
“aims at action, i.e. at actualizing itself”), Eingestelltheit seeks to adjust to a 
given system or practice and the enjoyment of its mere repetition, particularly 
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in the form of a ‘virtuoso’ performance, thus always remaining within the 
logic of the system. This opposition brings out a seeming paradox which is 
most revealing, namely, that while Gesinnung is both personal (life conduct 
is mainly rooted in personal life) and self-transcending, Eingestelltheit by 
contrast is impersonal and self-centred. Thus being personal, Gesinnung 
is susceptible to ethical conduct, its ethical meaning lying precisely in its 
self-transcending character, while Eingestelltheit, being impersonal, is devoid 
of ethical meaning—indeed meaning and satisfaction are found not in 
an ethical conduct which is beyond or beneath its scope but in the “self-
centred passions [it] entrenches” (Darmon, Ibid.),5 that is, in the satisfaction 
of repetition and the desire for power and its enjoyment. A dual drive-
desire dispositif is at work here: on the one hand, the capitalist drive fi nds 
satisfaction in adaptation and adjustment to the mechanism of endless 
capital circulation; on the other hand, the desire for power and the jouissance 
it brings. While this desire, as we have seen, reinforces drive, in reality it is 
contingent on drive and serves as a kind of compensation for being stuck, as 
if were, in Eingestelltheit. All are caught in this mutually reinforcing loop of 
objectivized urge to adjust and self-gravitating quest for jouissance, which 
is of course also served by capital—the single result being that the world 
remains as it is: mere matter to be processed by capital. It seems thus clear 
that it is fundamentally Eingestelltheit, this inner disposition to adjust and 
more broadly adaptation with all the supplements of jouissance it involves, 
what defi nes our time—a time whose frenzy cannot hide its real, namely: 
being a petrifi ed time.
We can, with Machiavelli’s help, put all this in a much more political language 
which will in addition allow us to grasp better the historical specifi city of our 
times. In effect, in Machiavelli’s terms, the peculiarity of our times would 
seem to be that they constitute an unheard-off combination of servitude and 
licence—servitude which is the other side of tyranny (hence one only needs to 
refer to one of the terms to mean the inseparable couple ‘servitude-tyranny’), 
and license which is Machiavelli’s name not just for anarchy, but for lassitude, 
hedonism, permissiveness and, to sum up, jouissance. In a crucial chapter of 
the Florentine Histories (IV 1) Machiavelli challenges the widespread belief 
that cities frequently change their regimes “between liberty and servitude”, 
and affi rms that the changes are rather between “servitude [i.e. servitude-
5 See Darmon (2011). In addition to bringing out the importance of Eingestelltheit and some of 
its main specifi cities with regard to Gesinnung, this paper shows that Boltanski and Chiapello’s 
laborious claim about a supposed New ‘spirit’ of Capitalism (Verso: 2005) is unfounded and largely 
based on mistaking new forms of adaptation and inner adjustment (and the moralising enveloping 
it all) for a new ‘spirit’.
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tyranny] and license”. In this connection, our times, in another turn of the 
screw, seem to have brought to a halt these shifts, so that we now live under 
a regime which automatically produces, reproduces and works on the basis 
of an entrenched combination of servitude-tyranny and license—this would 
be the true substance of the alleged ‘end of history’ thesis. Leaving aside the 
fact that in reality Machiavelli does by no means consider servitude-tyranny 
and licence as incompatible (indeed his view constitutes a sophisticated 
avant la lettre version of Montaigne’s Discourse of Voluntary Servitude), what 
is fundamental in his affi rmation that all too often the historical shifts take 
place between servitude-tyranny and licence is that politics in the sense of 
the struggle for a free way of life has been deactivated. Thus the humours 
or passions or desires involved there are not the two antagonistic political 
desires, the desire to dominate and the desire not to be dominated (Prince 9; 
Discourses I 4and 5.2; Histories II 12 and III 1)—desires whose very political 
nature emerges from and is defi ned by their confl icting interplay, so that we 
have here a kind of Hegelian ‘dialectical antagonism’ which is constitutive 
of the political terrain.6 Instead, the desires prevailing in that situation, 
according to Machiavelli’s detailed description in Florentine Histories, are 
not two, but many: a whole variety of “diverse humours” as “everyone ha[s] 
a different end” (III 21); secondly, the nature of such desires is constituted by 
“private enmities” (V 4), involving suspicions, vengeance, envy, jealousy and 
hatred; thirdly, they are usually organised, shaped and exploited by parties, 
factions or sects, hence they are the humours of the parties (II 10 and IV 26); 
lastly, and as a consequence of all this, Machiavelli often (dis)qualifi es them 
politically as “malignant”, “ill” or “wicked humours”.7
However, all this proliferation of private enmities fed on envy, hatred and the 
like constitutes only an apparent variety of desires, since each individual’s own 
passions differ in nothing essential, other than in being her or his own and 
perhaps in the dose, from those of other individuals, so that in reality there 
is only one desire and many carriers in competitive confl ict with one another. 
We can thus see that by emphasising the shifts between servitude-tyranny 
and licence Machiavelli points to the rarity of politics, for the presence of any 
6 Of course this dialectical antagonism is without dialectical synthesis, which should not be seen 
as a fl aw in Machiavelli’s hallmark theorisation of the political passions or desires; far from that, 
Machiavelli’s thought, his apparently unfi nished conceptualisations and digressions enmeshed in a 
variety of lively narratives, not only gives the lie to the dominant idea of him being the founder of 
a positive science, even a technique, of politics, but seems most apt to expose politics or a political 
praxis which is by defi nition without closure. In other words: what Althusser (1995 and 1999b) has 
so well captured as the unwonted character of Machiavelli’s thought, the very fact that it grips and 
simultaneously disconcerts us so much, is the best sign of its profound political character.
7 Histories II 16, IV 26 and Discourses I 7; Discourses III 3; and Histories IV 28.
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or both of these situations implies the absence of the antagonistic two which 
is the sign of a truly political or free way of life. What is new today is not just 
this absence of politics, but the fact that its neutralisation has become part 
of the regular workings of the capitalist machinery. We live today in what 
Žižek, echoing Rancière, has called “post-politics” (1999: 198), the age of the 
alleged overcoming of politics in which confl ict would have been reduced 
to confl ict of interests and political action and government to competent, 
expertise-based administration and ‘governance’. But ‘post-politics’ is a very 
problematic term, perhaps simply inadequate, at any rate very confusing and 
misleading. The term reveals the ideological pretension, liberal par excellence, 
to overcome politics, while it conceals the highly effective ideological labour 
of depoliticization or naturalisation it serves and the kind of compatible (that 
is, outwardly oriented) politicization it requires and promotes. For “pure 
post-politics”, as Žižek argues, “is inherently impossible” (2009b: 268); it 
needs an explicitly political supplement compatible with the ‘post-political’ 
sophistry, and “populist politicization” (Ibid.), with its totally simplistic 
fl attening of the complexity of reality and the creation of scapegoats such as 
the ‘immigrants’, undoubtedly provides this ideal supplement.
The conceptual inadequacy of the term ‘post-politics’ lies above all in that 
it unproblematizes ‘post-political’ administration, obfuscating its very 
political nature and concealing the ease with which, given an appropriate 
context (for example, contemporary Europe), its intrinsic link with populist 
politics can go a little step further in deploying its immanent tendencies 
and become a link with fascism. Perhaps the fi rst thing to state, to avoid 
misunderstandings, is that ‘post-politics’ is simply the name for the liberal 
politico-ideological pretension, and therefore nothing new at all. What is 
new today is that liberalism is not challenged by any suffi ciently coherent 
and organised alternative politics. Regarding liberalism’s ‘post-political’ 
pretension, we must ask: is not Hobbes’s operation a political attempt to 
negate politics internally by erecting an authoritarian state based on the 
individuals’ relinquishment of their political capacities in exchange for the 
security of their lives and property? Administration and government have 
since then been, with some drawbacks and discontinuities, ‘post-political’, 
and so focused on (politically) disposing and arranging things so as to allow 
the smooth, undisturbed functioning and expansion of the capitalist logic—
this aspect, but with telling ambiguity and deafening silences regarding 
the capitalist aim and logic, is what, to general acclaim, Foucault (2004a) 
conceptualised as ‘governmentality’. It is this liberal governmental rationality 
which, in accordance with the needs of capital and in blatant contradiction 
with the liberal laissez-faire ideologemes which, as I show elsewhere (Frade 
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2007), Foucault took too literally—the idea of governing through ‘freedom’ 
and the suspicion that “on gouverne toujours trop”, i.e. there is always 
too much government (2004b: 324)—transformed the state into the huge 
centralized bureaucratic machine we know today. As Polanyi (1957) has 
documented and explained, liberal political interventionism has since the 
19th century resorted more and more to administrative methods in order to 
radically transform social life, which has resulted in an exponential growth 
of the state’s administrative functions, including totally new functions of 
surveillance, policing, control and certainly discipline and punishment—all 
done so as to enable the state to satisfy the demands of capital, whose free 
circulation obviously requires the constantly renewed and growing control 
over society. Today the administrative method has become a much more 
freehand, i.e. managerial, method.
Managerialism constitutes today’s main instantiation of the regime of 
servitude-tyranny and license, one that in a signifi cant measure imposes 
the former by resorting to the latter. The managerialisation (that is, the 
commodifi cation and managerialisation, as these constitute the two sides 
of a single phenomenon) of social matter is something we see relentlessly 
pursued today in education, health care and almost any realm of social life. 
To managerialise social matter essentially consists in two parallel processes: 
fi rstly, destroying the inner logic and the dignity of a social realm (e.g. 
education, health care) by subjecting it to specifi cally designed external 
instruments of domination such as satisfaction questionnaires addressed to 
individuals as mere consumers or subjects of jouissance (e.g. National Student 
Survey, student ‘experience’ indicators and ‘feed-back’ forms which measure 
the individuals’ jouissance), targets and league tables; and, secondly, using 
these instruments in order to pit all and each against all and each (all an 
each: academics, students, departments, faculties, universities and, if we 
take into account the regime of control under which universities are put 
to work, regions and countries). Managerialism is an extremely contagious 
fanatical political ideology which has transformed all institutions and 
administrations (hospital and all National Health Service organisations; 
schools, universities and all educational institutions; local councils and all 
‘public’ institutions) into corporate managerial bureaucracies, organisational 
machines which are the very antithesis of an institution, designed precisely 
in order to be divested of any ins-tituting function and endowed instead with 
the function of des-tituting all symbolic orientations and subjectivities which 
obstruct the mere adaptation and adjustment to the circulation of capital, 
which they serve. Corporate managerial bureaucracies are therefore ‘des-
titutions’; run, in accordance with their nature, by managers, and organised 
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as pyramidal hierarchies, they constitute the contemporary embodiment, a 
very accomplished one, of servitude-tyranny which rule much of our daily 
lives today.
We thus arrive at the third dimension of this initial characterisation of 
our present. It is this dimensions which poses, if not the most important 
then at least the most urgent problem, for it is the one that more directly 
shapes our temporality—a wholly new temporality largely determined by 
what I wish to call, putting Naomi Klein’s book title (2008) under a proper 
Machiavellian context, terror shock politics. It is not so much the terror shocks 
as such what makes our time wholly new, for they are not less nor more 
new than modern capitalism, whose fi rst terror shock goes under the name 
of ‘primary accumulation’ or enclosures. The newness today is rather their 
totally devastating pace, their ever more recurrent frequency, to the point 
that they become normalised and defi ning of the everyday. 
Terror shock politics is not merely about the way capitalism takes advantage 
of catastrophes (supposedly external to capitalism) such as natural disasters, 
wars or crises. Terror shocks are, as said, of the essence of modern capitalism, 
whose beginning (and let me emphasise ‘beginning’) saw the terror shock 
of forcing out hundreds of thousands of families from their land—‘primary 
accumulation’ is the theoretical name of this initial shock, ‘enclosures’ is the 
name of its political weapon, and ‘masterless men’ and ‘free’ labour their 
medieval-looking and modern names. Nor are the terror shocks only or 
solely the coups d’etat (like in Chile and Indonesia, to give but two examples) 
perpetrated to clear the ground for the unobstructed introduction of ‘free’ 
market capitalism. They take place at different territorial, sectoral and 
institutional levels, and at any moment, as is shown by the frequent terror 
shocks of privatisations and expropriations of institutions (universities, 
hospitals), entire sectors and fi elds (the forest) and of course countries and 
economic areas such as the EU (e.g. the so-called cuts or austerity, which 
have just been declared practically permanent). In addition to governments, 
the perpetrators par excellence of this terroristic politics are the corporate 
managerial bureaucracies referred to above, which incorporate such politics 
into their very design.
What terror shock politics does is not merely expropriate and appropriate 
the commons; in reality if it does that and is successful in doing it, it is 
because of the way in which terror shapes and moulds human matter, which 
is turned into a tabula rasa ready to start from scratch. Thus terror shock 
politics literally and plainly wipes the slate clean (see Žižek 2009a: 17ff), that 
An Altogether New Prince Five Centuries On 
 SITUATIONS, VOL. V, NO. 1   53 
is, in Machiavellian language, turns human matter into politically inert or 
de-subjectivated matter ready to be given whatever form is deemed appropriate 
at any moment to adapt and adjust to the mechanisms of capital circulation 
and the supplements of jouissance this may bring. De-subjectivation is 
precisely the mission of des-titutions, the organisational machines endowed 
with the task of divesting individuals of any subjectivated disposition and 
with the power to resort to terror shocks as a matter of course. Individuals 
are thereby brought to a kind of ‘state of nature’, the liberal mythical state 
in which all they care about is comfortable self-preservation and even mere 
self-preservation. Absolute exposure and therefore fear are then inwardly 
transformed into an urge to adapt and adjust which may take more or less 
enthusiastic or reluctant forms but is always ready to unquestionably and 
with astonishing doses of cynicism strip one’s being off any substantive 
attachment to a praxis and the pride that goes with it. As we can witness more 
and more frequently, individuals in this situation, e.g. academics, become a 
kind of ‘non-beings’ with no pride left, totally isolated and mistrustful of 
each other, or turning against one another, who can be moved about like 
frightened animals—indeed academics are an exemplary case of what exactly 
politically inert matters looks like.
It is thus manifest that terror shock politics amounts to a total twist of 
Machiavelli’s (in)famous idea: “If one wishes a sect or a republic to live long, it 
is necessary to draw it back (ritirarla) often toward its beginning (principio)”—
thus he entitles a central chapter of his Discourses (III 1), where beginning 
means both commencement and principle. It is the famous renewal of virtù 
by bringing about the terror of the founding moment or rather moments, 
since founding for Machiavelli is a continuous activity. What is renewed 
today is not virtù, but its nemesis, corruption. In other words: the aim of 
terror shock politics is to terrorise people so as to make them totally unfi t or 
inept for a political or free way of life.
It is this continuously renewed de-subjectivation what defi nes our wholly 
new temporality: the temporality of the human animal striving for self-
preservation and a supplement of jouissance—which brings to us a seemingly 
paradoxical lesson, namely: that the mythical state of the original or fi rst 
humans coincides with the Nietzschean state of the last humans, with the 
latter self-contentedly proclaiming that it has discovered happiness, or at 
least the means for attaining it, and the former that there is no alternative. 
We should therefore be no surprised if this extinct or wordless present, as 
Badiou (2006) has qualifi ed it, relentlessly addresses us through its defi ning 
twofold injunction against thought and for happiness: the injunction to 
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adapt, which means (and so is understood as soon as it is uttered) ‘do not 
think, adapt’, and the injunction to enjoy, the innocuous, because self-
centred, jouissance which is also served by capital. What is thus preached 
is creeping conformism: to be stuck in the world as the world is, without 
trying to change it. This preaching can only come from the most reactionary 
politics, the politics stemming from a world which is totally petrifi ed and has 
no future—if by future we understand something more than the thoughtless 
passage of time.
3.  A ‘TRUTH TRUER THAN ANY OTHER TRUTH’: 
KEEPING THE PEOPLE ARMED
“How, then, are we to revolutionize an order whose very principle is constant 
self-revolutionizing?”, thus Žižek (2009a: 129) formulates the fundamental 
question. It is a variant of this question that we have to address here—
one which takes explicitly into account, fi rstly, that such constant self-
revolutionizing is of a very specifi c kind (as it renews corruption or political 
unfi tness), and, secondly, that an order subjected to that principle is in reality 
a petrifi ed order. Perhaps the fi rst thing to be said is that there is no answer, 
nor should we look for the answer, to this question, since it has to be found 
and developed politically. What we can do here, drawing on the analysis we 
have done in the foregoing pages and on Machiavelli’s thought, is to provide 
some hints as to the types of intervention that can be effective and where 
they may be located. In this respect, it is important to see that although 
the question we have posed cannot be answered straight away, its very 
formulation does provide a fi rst decisive indication as to what to do, namely, 
that refusing to collaborate as a fundamental form of action consisting in not 
acting may be as important, particularly at the beginning, as positive action. 
Of course this leads to another question: where and how to fi nd the resources 
to act in these two senses of action?—which brings us to the problem of the 
people and to the central characteristic of a free people: how confl icting or 
tumultuous it is and the kind of confl icts it engages in.
We started this paper by stating, with Machiavelli, that all peoples are capable 
of virtù. Now is the moment to draw the implications of this axiomatic 
prescription. However, where are the people today—not the people as the 
object and partly the result of the terroristic politics we have just seen, 
nor the people as a substantial entity with sociological properties, but as a 
political category, that is, the people (in whatever of its fi gures) as a political 
subject—as the peculiar political subject which Machiavelli had the courage 
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to theorise and situate in the political stage? To this I can only answer that 
the sole people we have recently seen, and only for some weeks, were the 
Egyptian people, as they named themselves. Let us assume that the people 
are the inexistent (Badiou 2006) of our time, and that the altogether new 
prince will be, if it is to measure up to our wholly new temporality, neither 
a singular individual nor a revolutionary avant-garde of the party form, but 
a varying and polymorphous collective fi gure of the people—a wholly new 
fi gure of the people able to take on different forms, forms suitable to different 
situations and tasks, perhaps simply—but decisively—vanishing afterwards, 
whilst holding on to what Machiavelli called the truth that “is truer than 
any other truth” (Discourses I 21.1): keeping the people intellectually and 
materially armed, that is, subjectivated and ready to fi ght. This is the single 
mission and function of the new prince—a mission whose fulfi lment will 
demand different forms of organization in different situations within a time 
already defi ned by the new prince.
It is above all in addressing the people that we risk recoiling from looking ‘il 
male in viso’, for there is a certain unwillingness in the left, when dealing 
with the people, to look at ‘reality’ in the face, coupled with a tendency to 
indulge in a kind of overexcited discourse on the multitude. Machiavelli’s 
stance should teach us something fundamental here. For Machiavelli was 
a fl atterer neither of princes nor of peoples. He was “of the people” (Prince, 
Dedication) and a true lover of the people, as shown by the fact that he 
wanted to take and did take upon himself that “hard province [task or 
endeavour]”—he says—of “defend[ing] a thing”, i.e. the people in its active 
fi gure as multitude, which “has been accused by all writers”—and we ought 
to trust Machiavelli when he says that such an endeavour is “hard and full 
of so much diffi culty” (Discourses I 58.1). That is true love, based not on 
delusions and self-indulgency, but on a courageous gaze at the world and the 
knowledge gained from this attitude. 
It is in the context of this Machiavellian stance that I would like to situate 
one of the invariant ideas of the Badiouian fourfold matrix of revolutionary 
politics (2006: Preface section 5): trust in the people. This is a logical 
consequence, and not a mere strategic rule, of the egalitarian prescription that 
people can think and are capable of truth;8 it implies an active disposition 
which must be made manifest, often through hard work, by constructing 
practices both in different social realms and transversal to them. For example, 
8 “and although peoples, as Tully [Cicero] says, are ignorant, they are capable of truth” (Discourses 
I 4).
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in the university, and more generally in education, where the idea that 
‘students can think’ is the fi rst elementary axiom of any true teacher. One has 
therefore to dispute the widespread attitude which resigns itself in advance 
to the convenient view that students are not interested anyway—that’s a false 
statement, one that often becomes a self-fulfi lling prophecy, and an excuse 
for not fulfi lling one’s duties as a teacher, duties which obviously involve 
risk and courage, particularly today, in view of the violent transformation 
of students into mere consumers. It is precisely those who resort to those 
excuses who are fl atterers of students, that is, who have given in and devote 
themselves to pleasing their own and the students’ quest for enjoyment, of 
course at the expense of the potentially self-transcending passions involved 
in any genuine education. This is just an example, but the same obtains with 
regard to the political capacity of workers and the virtù of peoples. The lesson 
to be drawn is that without trust in the people and the hard work it involves 
no emancipation is possible, since the point is not to make people happy 
whilst keeping them in servitude, but free.
And what can we say (in an initial approach) about confl ict? If we continue 
to exercise the Machiavellian incisive and sober gaze, we could perhaps say 
that confl ict and expressions of discontent defi ne our present in part by their 
(near) absence and in part by the (near) futility of its typical forms. How 
can we understand this apparently paradox of confl ict being absent and at 
the same time futile? Economic confl ict is totally segmented and partial, 
while trade unions themselves are profoundly managerialised. Confl ict in 
the current situation is essentially confl ict between a variety of groups and 
identities. In the case of strikes, for instance, they usually take place against 
heavy, even vicious, media-promoted hostility from the rest of groupings 
and identities which, under the name of customers, users or public opinion, 
tend to consider any disturbance to their sacred right to enjoyment almost 
as a crime. In this situation it is even easier than in Machiavelli’s time to 
turn to the neighbour, to one’s fellow, usually under the name of immigrant 
or any of the abounding ethnic and religious identities—in other words: to 
turn side-wards instead of turning up-wards. So, although there are confl icts, 
in reality most of them have practically nothing to do with political confl ict 
proper. On the contrary, such confl icts have devastating depoliticising effects, 
because they are competitive confl icts, whose workings refl ect the pyramidal 
hierarchy of servitude and only serve to reinforce it—and not antagonistic 
confl icts, whose workings put into question the system and seek to change it. 
But it is also true that the discontent is immense and is there—only it fi nds 
no political ways of expression. Indeed that very discontent is for the most 
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part not political; it is misconceived and therefore misarticulated and mis-
expressed. Here we have the example of Greek left coalition which almost won 
the last general election: Syriza, probably the best that has happened to the 
left for decades. If Syriza has proved anything, it is that such discontent can 
be politically re-conceived and channelled in the appropriate emancipatory 
direction, that people listen to good reasons when these are presented to 
them (and is not Syriza the only ‘voice of reason’ in Greece today?) and that 
they can act, even under enormous diffi culties.
The central diffi culty to produce the split into Two of politics today is of 
course the mechanical and impersonal character of the capitalist machinery, 
which has brought about a huge and apparently insurmountable gap between 
the people, on the one hand, and the state and the automatisms of the 
machinery over which it presides, on the other—look at how the machineries 
of privatization, appropriation and managerialisation of education and 
health care in Madrid continue impassively to function, as if nothing was 
happening, despite the almost daily strikes and demonstrations by teachers, 
doctors, nurses, students and patients! Or at ‘privatization by stealth’ in 
Britain and elsewhere. This means that political confl ict today requires to 
address both the system and those who head it: the cannibal oligarchy we 
endure today and its executive arm, that is, the easily recruitable and growing 
managerial class which, through the des-titutions created for that purpose, 
occupies key positions at all levels and in all realms of social life.
And how can we deal with an oligarchy? This should pose no doubts after 
Machiavelli: as he shows in the Discourses (I 58), whereas a mad people can 
be persuaded by words, for a mad prince, i.e. for an oligarchy, there is not 
“any remedy other than steel (il ferro)”. So, ‘il ferro’, which means obviously 
‘il ferro’ and the threat thereof, and more generally a political force able to 
coerce the oligarchy into understanding, since it is not in a position to do so 
by words, and therefore ultimately to resort to violence, if need be. In other 
words: the new prince will be a true prince, a collective being of virtù acting 
in the world, with no trace of the moralising, political correctness, leftist 
‘saintliness’ and escapist strategies which have brought the left to the political 
nullity it is today. Once again Syriza provides a fi tting example of what the 
left needs today: on the one hand, of how the political strength it was able 
to wield compelled the European oligarchy to resort to a massive and most 
vicious campaign of fear to prevent Syriza from winning the elections. On 
the other hand, Syriza is now in a decisive crossroads: what is it going to do, 
seeing as it sees the neo-Nazi party (Golden Dawn) gaining more and more 
ground by resorting to the standard fascist recipe of creating a scapegoat (the 
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immigrant) with which to provide a fake political being to the people and 
doing so, which is also in the recipe, with the connivance of the state? Syriza 
must be bold and continue along the path it opened, but now take a step 
further: and since they cannot allow the people of Greece to become either 
nothingness or criminals, they must work hard on helping the people to self-
organise themselves and construct a true political being. This task may well 
require, among other things, the creation of civil militias, a political form 
destined to give life, not mere animal life but proud human life, that may 
soon be needed elsewhere and not only in Greece, for, paraphrasing what 
Marx told the German readership of the fi rst volume of Capital, we should 
say: Oh humans, oh forgetful peoples of Europe, pay attention: De te fabula 
narratur, the tale is told of you, not only of ‘them’.
But all these, and Syriza itself, are only provisional forms which make the 
new prince conceivable. The condition of possibility, the ‘occasione’, for 
its emergence is there, in the void of an untold discontent. All the rest is 
up to us; the task is enormous, its diffi culties utmost—but it will be gladly 
confronted if we hold onto our desire and, beyond hope and fear, “never give 
up” (Discourses II 29).
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